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Imitation in faith: enacting Paul’s ambiguous pistis Christou
formulations on a Greco-Roman stage
Suzan J. M. Sierksma-Agteres
Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
There is an ongoing debate in New Testament scholarship on the
correct interpretation of Paul’s pistis Christou formulations: are we
justiﬁed by our own faith/trust in Christ, or by participating in
Christ’s faith and faithfulness towards God? This article contributes
to the position of purposeful or sustained ambiguity by reading
Paul’s imitation – and faith(fulness) – language against the back-
ground of Hellenistic-Roman thought on and practice of imitation.
In particular, the mimetic chain between teachers and students
training for a philosophical disposition, and the philosophical
topos of ‘becoming like God’ (homoiōsis theōi) oﬀer material valu-
able for comparison. Since pistis, ﬁdes and cognates are used in
these settings as both a quality to imitate and as attitude towards
a model, and since, conversely, imitation is very much involved in
Paul’s pistis-vocabulary, it makes sense to read pistis Christou as
shorthand for a mimetic movement of faith(fulness) via Christ
towards God.
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Within New Testament scholarship, a very particular debate has been carried on for
decades now, related to the meaning of several variations of the expression pistis
Christou in the letters of the apostle Paul1. The discussion arises from the plurality of
possible meanings, due to the ambiguity of the noun pistis on the one hand, and to the
various possible relationships denoted by the genitive case on the other, resulting in the
most common translations of ‘faith in Christ’, a so-called objective genitive, or ‘faithful-
ness of Christ’, a so-called subjective genitive construction. Grammatically, both
options are valid and possible2. Contextually, the Pauline epistles can back up both
positions. Theologically, there is a lot at stake, for diﬀerent interpretations oﬀer
diﬀerent answers to questions like ‘how can one be made righteous?’, ‘is righteousness
an individual or collective aﬀair?’ and ‘how human do we envision Christ to be?’3
Judging from some recent contributions, the dust is not quite settled down just yet4.
The interpretation of Pauline theology as a whole, if such a construct exists, aﬀects the
interpretation of the formula, while the same is true for the opposite direction, thus
trapping the interpreter in a hermeneutical circle5. So, to put it in hopeful terms, the
question is how to escape this two-dimensional closed ﬁgure. I argue that in the ancient
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Mediterranean moral praxis of imitation, and particularly in the philosophical topos of
assimilation to God, we ﬁnd an external model that may help us to visualize the logic
behind Paul’s pistis Christou formulations6.
Before I enter upon these themes of imitation and assimilation, it is helpful to have a
look at the linguistic presuppositions involved in the pistis Christou debate. What most
contributions have in common is the wish to ‘disambiguate’ the formula7. Recently,
however, there seems to be a growing awareness that it may not be a matter of either–
or. One early exception to the disambiguation trend is Richard Hays, who in the late
nineties was responsible for putting the matter ﬁrmly on the scholarly agenda with his
dissertation The faith of Jesus Christ. As regards the choice between faith or faithfulness,
he ‘challenges’ James Dunn, a spokesperson for the ‘faith in Christ’ interpretation, ‘to
show that it was semantically possible in Hellenistic Greek to make such a conceptual
distinction. The single word πίστις carries both connotations. Therefore, Dunn’s dis-
tinction is anachronistic, a semantic fallacy’8. In response to him, however, Barry
Matlock refers to lexical semantics and encourages us to start ‘thinking in terms of
the contextual selection of discrete senses of words’9. Hays indeed appears to fall prey to
yet another fallacy, namely supposing that all meanings or uses of a word apply to any
given instance, James Barr’s famous ‘illegitimate totality transfer’10. Indeed, Matlock’s
approach, to ‘de-theologize’ the debate by calling in the help of linguistics, is a fruitful
one, and I fully acknowledge that language users generally understand ambiguous
words by excluding the non-applying meanings based on markers in the direct context.
What Matlock does not address, unfortunately, is the possibility that the ambiguity was
in fact intended, or at least not intentionally excluded by Paul.
Apart from Hays, this possibility has been hinted at by scholars like Daniel Lynwood
Smith and Robert Jewett, yet they do not further develop or substantiate it11. An
excellent case for ‘sustained ambiguity’ on the basis of the evidence of ancient semantics
is made by Gerald Downing. After surveying a range of ancient authors on the issue of
language ambiguity and using these insights as a lens to Paul’s faith(fulness) language,
he concludes:
[I]n Paul’s world, trust in someone was itself founded in, and displayed and presupposed
belief in their trustworthiness (as well as, most likely, their willingness to trust you): faith
in Jesus would necessarily imply (unless explicitly denied) at the least a trust in his
faithfulness. Ancient expectations of words have them carry much of their semantic
baggage with them, whatever part of their range appears in context to be foregrounded;
that is, unless some elements of their range have been speciﬁcally discarded.12
It is an important observation that trust (faith) in fact implies the trustworthiness
(faithfulness) of the one in whom trust is placed. Taking a fresh approach to early
Christian texts from the perspective of the ‘shape of trust’ in the Greco-Roman society,
Teresa Morgan arrives at a similar understanding of pistis Christou as ‘doubly
reciprocal’:
It is precisely the fact that Christ is both faithful to God and worthy of God’s trust,
trustworthy by human beings and trusted by them, that enables him to take those who
pisteuein into righteousness (and human beings, in turn, to spread the word to others)13.
To take any one of these two or even four dimensions away, then, would imply a major
injustice to the core message of the apostle14.
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If it is indeed plausible that Paul exploits this ambiguity in his pistis Christou
formulations, based on ancient semantic theory and actual language use of the pistis
(and ﬁdes) word group in Paul’s days, it is helpful to understand how this ambiguity
plays out if we were to imagine its ‘enactment’. One of the many merits of the renewed
philosophical attention to Paul is the understanding of faith as a performative utterance,
as elucidated by Giorgio Agamben: it ‘immediately produces a real fact’15. Yet, what is
the underlying reality or materiality, the associative background, or in terms of cogni-
tive linguistics, the ‘frame’ of pistis Christou? Hays explicitly lists as an area that requires
further elaboration ‘[t]he cultural/semantic background of Paul’s πίστις language: how
would Paul’s uses of this terminology have been understood by his readers within the
ancient Mediterranean world?’16 Downing does not oﬀer a speciﬁc cultural embedded-
ness. Morgan suggests that a parallel can be found in the ancient practice of mediation,
like that between the emperor Tiberius and revolting legions in Germany with the help
of Germanicus, his nephew (Tacitus, Annales 1.31–52)17. While such mediation oﬀers
an interesting illustration of the multivalence of and reciprocity inherent to ﬁdes
language, there is a more obvious choice when looking for a cultural ‘habitat’ of
Paul’s pistis Christou language, because of both its day-to-day occurrence in the social
context of Paul’s addressees and its frequent explicit and implicit use in the Pauline
epistles. I am referring to the practice of moral imitation.
With sayings like ‘imitate me as I imitate Christ’ (1 Cor 11.1) or ‘you became
imitators of us and of the Lord’ (1 Thes 1.6), Paul explicitly describes his project in
terms of imitation. This motive is not completely alien to the whole pistis Christou
debate either. In this discourse, it usually belongs to the terminology of those arguing
for a ‘faith(fulness) of Christ’ interpretation: it is Christ’s faith(fulness) in/to God that
believers imitate18. Adversely, it is discarded by the opposite position for being too
ethical, too horizontal, for expecting too little of Gods saving act and too much of the
human response19. However, in a recent article, following up on her earlier contribu-
tions, Morna Hooker explicitly combines a stance on pistis Christou being purpose-
fully ambiguous with the model of imitation: ‘The lexica’s diﬀerent deﬁnitions reﬂect
what is in fact a hen-and-egg situation. Our trust/faith is founded in the trustworthi-
ness/faithfulness of God, but those who trust in him become like him, trustworthy in
their turn’20. Like others, Hooker is uncomfortable with connotations of the word
imitation, proposing to speak of ‘participation’, ‘conformity’ or ‘sharing in what
Christ is’ instead21. While it is quite alright to wish to avoid unhelpful modern
connotations, however, this should not make us blind to the ubiquitous presence of
imitation in ancient societies. It is unfortunate that, even though the model of
imitation as such is sometimes mentioned in relation to Paul’s usage of pistis
Christou, the model is, to my knowledge, solely used as an exegetical tool within
the Pauline corpus, whilst leaving aside the extensive resource of contemporary pagan
material. Adversely, there is an increasing amount of literature on the subject of
Greco-Roman imitation and its application within the Pauline letters, yet here the
topic of imitation in pistis is neglected22.
With this article, I aim to contribute by combining precisely these themes. In
taking the pagan practice of moral imitation as a starting point, with special aware-
ness to those cases in which pistis and cognates are involved, I will set a stage on
which the role of Paul’s pistis Christou language might be better understood, from
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the perspective of his Greco-Roman audience23. This metaphorical ‘stage’ consists of
an analysis of the discourses involved: that of moral imitation in general, moral
imitation in the context of practising philosophy, in particular, and moral imitation
of the gods as an even more particular philosophical topos24. I will thus draw from a
large range of source material, mostly roughly contemporary to Paul, from the ﬁrst
century BCE to the second CE, but occasionally reaching back as far as Epicurus or
Plato, when it is plausible that these sources were considered part of the later
discourse. Diﬀerences between philosophical schools will sometimes be addressed
to clarify the breadth of issues involved, yet as I consider the diﬀerent positions part
of one and the same popular philosophical discourse, I will not diﬀerentiate in
advance between their relative inﬂuence on Paul25.
In the next section, I will ﬁrst survey a diversity of genres attesting to the function of
pistis as means and end of moral imitation, i.e. pistis as an attitude enabling imitation
and as a moral quality to imitate. Next, the speciﬁc setting of philosophical education
demonstrates that pistis was seen as an important element in a philosophical disposition
and as such functions in a mimetic chain of masters and students. Thereafter, a much
more speciﬁc ancient philosophical topos is addressed that goes by the name of
homoiōsis theōi, in which the gods are the object of imitation, participation or assimila-
tion. From this setting, I return to Paul, arguing that in his message, pistis is enacted in
precisely such a setting of imitation, with Christ, and diﬀerent human models function-
ing as trusting and trustworthy intermediaries between the faithful God and the faithful
believer.
2. Pistis as virtue and attitude in ancient character formation
From the statues in the theatres to tablets with copying exercises, and from
honorary inscriptions at the forum to literary rivalry, the whole social sphere of
the early Roman empire breathed the air of imitation26. In the familial context,
children were expected to mimic their parents’ and ancestors’ civic virtues27. This
form of imitation had its limits though, as Cicero indicates: vices are not to be
imitated and not every child is capable to imitate every parental virtue like speaking
eloquently or conducting wars, yet a virtue like faithfulness is among those which
are in everyone’s reach (Cicero lists iustitiam, ﬁdem, liberalitatem, modestiam and
temperantiam)28. Anyone who had the beneﬁt of receiving some form of education
would start by closely following the forms of characters written by their teachers
and proceed to the rhythms of poetry, the rules of rhetoric and the literary patterns
laid out by model poets, orators and philosophers29. Yet, also in the educational
context, imitation included the aspect of character formation, for by imitating
literary examples students achieved likeness (homoiotēs) to both the style of the
author and the moral characteristics of the exemplary subject matter30. The teacher’s
role, however, was the ultimate moral paradigm, a ‘living voice’ in front of the
students31.
Within literary genres such as rhetoric, biography and historiography, virtues were
demonstrated by using exempla from mythology or national history32. In these exam-
pla, pistis (or ﬁdes) recurs as one of the qualities worthy of imitation. Quintilian is
proud of Rome’s past ﬁlled with ideal examples:
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But it is not only the content of such studies as these which we should know and
constantly turn over in our minds; even more important are the records of the notable
sayings and actions of the past. Nowhere is there a larger or more striking supply of these
than in the history of our own country. Could there be any better teachers of courage,
justice, loyalty (ﬁdem), self-control, frugality, or contempt for pain and death than men
like Fabricius, Curius, Regulus, Decius, Mucius, and countless others? Rome is as strong in
examples as Greece is in precepts (praeceptis valent); and examples are more important33.
Quintilian argues that oratory and philosophy, eloquence and virtue go hand in
hand, and that both need precepts and even more examples34. These examples are
meant to ‘constantly turn over in our minds’, we are to, as the following sentence
states, ‘drink deep draughts of justice from this source’ for without it, we cannot live
‘the good live’, or ‘run honour’s race’, nor can we hope of becoming a good orator.
Oﬀering moral examples from the lives of famous historical men seems to have been
the primary motivation for authors like Plutarch and Valerius Maximus to write
whole collections of biographies (the Parallel Lives) or, in the latter’s case, ‘memor-
able deeds and sayings (facta et dicta memorabilia)’35. In one of Plutarch’s Lives,
Aemilius Paulus III is said to have refrained from pursuing a career built upon
private law cases or ingratiating the people. Instead, ‘he sought to acquire for himself
what was better than both, namely, a reputation arising from valour, justice, and
trustworthiness (τὴν ἀπ᾿ ἀνδρείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πίστεως δόξαν), in which he
at once surpassed his contemporaries’36.
According to the historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus, under the rule of Numa, even
the state could serve as a model in its ‘trustworthy and constant disposition (ἦθος
πιστὸν καὶ βέβαιον)’, by erecting a temple dedicated to Pistis (Fides), inﬂuencing its
citizenry to act likewise37. This seems to be an ampliﬁcation of the familiar motif of the
ruler as ultimate example of virtue38. Plutarch, for instance, advises the ‘uneducated
ruler’ to ‘ﬁrst gain command of himself, […] regulate his own soul and establish his
own character (καταστησάμενον τὸ ἦθος), then make his subjects ﬁt his pattern (οὕτω
συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον)’39. Elsewhere, when discussing the ultimate virtue of the
ruler, Plutarch argues that justice (δικαιοσύνη) is envied most, because of its pistis and
the pistis it manages to evoke among the masses:
For the fame and trustworthiness of no virtue, creates more envy than that of justice
(οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἀρετῆς δόξα καὶ πίστις ἐπιφθόνους ποιεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δικαιοσύνης),
because both power and trust (πίστις) follow it chieﬂy among the common folk. These
do not merely honour the just, as they do the brave, nor admire them merely, as they do
the wise, but they actually love the just, and put conﬁdence and trust in them (φιλοῦσι
τοὺς δικαίους καὶ θαρροῦσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ πιστεύουσιν)40.
So, rather than simply imitating the pistis exempliﬁed in the ideal statesman, here trust
is the proper response or attitude towards the trustworthiness that is inherent to the
virtue of justice. I shall argue below (Sections 5–7) that in Pauline literature, we ﬁnd
both uses of pistis, as dispositional quality to be imitated and as the proper attitude or
action towards an exemplar.
That trust is not only a virtue to be imitated but also an attitude towards models
is also conﬁrmed in diﬀerent sources. A cynic staged by Epictetus points at exam-
ples of vice to make clear that his public is looking for happiness in all the wrong
places:
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It is not in possessions. If you doubt that (εἰ δ᾿ ἀπιστεῖτε), look at Croesus, look at the rich
nowadays, the amount of lamentation with which their life is ﬁlled! (…) Whom are we
going to trust about this question (τίσιν περὶ τούτου πιστεύσομεν)?41
Here, people are asked to relate to negative examples, in order to determine where to
place their attitude of trust in order to lead a good life. The Delphic maxims also
contain such general warnings about wrongly placed trust: ‘do not trust wealth (πλουτω
απιστει)’, ‘do not trust fortune (τυχη μη πιστευε)’42. Epictetus presents us with a
philosopher addressing a broad, ‘popular’ audience, a genre in which positive and
negative mythical or historical examples were the ideal rhetorical tool43. But more
speciﬁcally, with the teachings of Epictetus, we have arrived at a somewhat distinct
cultural context in which ‘imitation in faith’ is especially evident and relevant to our
purposes: the context of philosophical education.
3. Imitating the master’s pistis: the mimetic chain of philosophical
education
Apart from the general examples of living faithfully or exercising faith in the civic
sphere we have discussed so far, there is a particular context in which the aim of
attaining a ‘trustworthy attitude’ or a ‘faithful disposition’ is especially frequent: the
context or discourse of practising philosophy. Unlike the present-day academic disci-
pline, in which ‘thinking correctly’ remains of paramount interest, the practice of
philosophy in antiquity can perhaps be apprehended by the phrase ‘practise what you
preach’ or ‘walk your talk’. Aristotle already stated this principle in terms of pistis: ‘in
matters of emotion and of action, words are less convincing than deeds (λόγοι ἧττόν
εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων)’44. According to the ﬁrst century Stoic Musonius Rufus, ‘virtue is
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) that is not merely theoretical, but also practical (πρακτικὲ) like
the arts of medicine or music’45. Hence, since philosophy is the greater art, ‘practical
training must follow invariably (τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπακολουθεῖν πάντως)’, even more than
in the study of medicine46.
This phenomenon of philosophy as a practice has recently been brought to the fore
by Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a Way of Life)47 and is investigated and scrutinized
further in John Sellars’ thesis The Art of Living: the Stoics on the Nature and Function of
Philosophy. Sellars describes the ancient understanding of philosophy as an art (technē),
encompassing both rational principles (logoi) and practical exercise (askēsis) with the
aim (telos) to produce corresponding actions (erga): ‘With this conception, philosophi-
cal knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) will directly impact upon one’s life (βίος) because such
knowledge will necessarily lead to philosophical actions (ἔργα)’48. Along these lines,
Dihle emphasizes that, even though the early Socratic tradition knew a ‘Beziehung zur
philosophischen Lebensgestaltung’, this focus came even more to the fore in post-
classical times: ‘Die platonisch-aristotelische Konzeption (…) verengte sich aber auf
das Bemühen om die Einsichten, die unmittelbar auf den Lebensvollzug anzuwenden
waren’49. In his monograph on philosophers in the Roman Empire, Michael Trapp
states that philosophy, as such, could ask sacriﬁces: ‘Philosophy, taken as seriously as it
showed itself to want to be taken, posed an evangelical challenge, to life-changing
commitment of a kind that could make awkward demands on the individual; in
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particular, it could demand the adoption of values and targets at odds with whose of
ordinary civic society’50. It is interesting that especially within this philosophical com-
munity of alternative values, the process of character formation includes the attainment
of a trustworthy disposition, as will be demonstrated below.
Within this practical philosophical context, the relationship between image and
imitator was ever so present. In the ﬁnal paragraph of one of his Moral Epistles, the
Roman politician and Stoic philosopher Seneca quotes – as often – a precept by
Epicurus and comments:
Choose a master whose life, conversation, and mind-expressing face (vita et oratio et ipse
animum ante se ferens vultus) have satisﬁed you; picture him always to yourself as your
protector or your pattern (illum tibi semper ostende vel custodem vel exemplum). For we
must indeed have someone according to whom we may regulate our characters (aliquo ad
quem mores nostri se ipsi exigent)51.
The master Seneca refers to, so it seems here, needs not necessarily be someone you
meet regularly or even someone you know personally, although intimate knowledge of
his life and mind should be very much present. Even more so, Seneca believes that the
actual real-life transmission between master and student is fundamental, as we learn
from a letter on ‘sharing knowledge’:
Of course, however, the living voice and the intimacy of a common life (viva vox et
convictus) will help you more than the written word. You must go to the scene of action,
ﬁrst, because men put more faith in their eyes than in their ears (quia homines amplius
oculis quam auribus credunt), and second, because the way is long if one follows precepts
(per praecepta), but short and helpful, if one follows patterns (per exempla). Cleanthes
could not have been the express image of Zeno (Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset), if he
had merely heard his lectures; he shared in his life, saw into his hidden purposes, and
watched him to see whether he lived according to his own rules. Plato, Aristotle, and the
whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his diﬀerent way, derived more beneﬁt
from the character than from the words (plus ex moribus quam ex verbis) of Socrates. It
was not the class-room of Epicurus, but living together under the same roof, that made
great men of Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus52.
With this rich list of examples, Seneca conﬁrms that transformation of character is the
aim of philosophy. Just as Quintilian, to this aim, he favours examples above precepts53.
He furthermore shows that the philosophical quest does not merely involve imaginary
relationships of imitation, but real-life Nachfolgung of school leaders54. Moreover, these
living embodiments of good character are better equipped to create the attitude of trust
or belief (credere), for they can be seen rather than merely heard. By contrast, Epictetus
points at the diﬃculty of the immense task of a teacher, ‘to make of you a perfect work,
secure against restraint, compulsion, and hindrance, free, prosperous, happy, looking to
God in everything both small and great; and you are here with the purpose of learning
and practising all this’55. Even though, according to his own Stoic doctrine, this ought
to be an attainable aim, for it is not outside of our control, he wonders why his student
does not succeed and deems this, as can be expected in a relationship of imitation, both
the student’s and the teacher’s fault56.
It is within this real-life philosophical education that the vocabulary of faith and trust
ﬁnds a ‘natural habitat’, sometimes as attitude towards an exemplar, yet mostly as one
of the qualities to imitate. In one of the allegedly pseudonymous letters ascribed to
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Plato, Aristodorus is praised for showing ‘the most philosophic disposition of all who
pursue philosophy (τὸ σοφώτατον ἦθος τῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρεχόμενον)’. This
philosophical ēthos is explicated as consisting in ‘the steadfast and trustworthy and
sound (τὸ γὰρ βέβαιον καὶ πιστὸν καὶ ὑγιές)’57. Whether or not this short letter was
actually written by Plato58, the document is valuable for the relevance of its contents,
for it is its readership in Hellenistic-imperial times that interests us here59. The
remarkable exclusion of intellectual capabilities or love of learning from the short
deﬁnition of true philosophy constitutes one of the reasons why its authenticity is
disputed60. Yet, the abundant use of ethical adjectives (bebaios, pistos, hugies) is telling
for precisely this reason: knowledge needs to be embedded in an ethical disposition
(ēthos) that is certain, trustworthy and sound, in order to qualify as such.
This emphasis on ﬁrmness and trustworthiness of character is also evident in the
otherwise divergent tradition of Epicureanism. Epicurus assures his student Pythocles
that knowledge of natural phenomena ‘does not serve any other purpose than imper-
turbability (ἀταραξία) and a ﬁrm conviction (πίστις βέβαιος)’61. Thus, knowledge is
envisaged as subservient to character transformation driven by ataraxia and a certain
pistis. A remarkably similar position is taken up across school boundaries. Cicero deems
it the task of philosophy to oﬀer assistance in the journey towards a good and happy
life62. He deﬁnes this assistance, echoing Epicurus, as the attainment of knowledge that
should lead to conﬁdence (ﬁdentia), banishing fear and other disturbances from the
mind63. The Stoics even thought that the ultimate philosopher, the sage, does not ever
lack this trust or conﬁdence, for ‘mistrust means the assumption of a falsehood (τὴν
γὰρ ἀπιστίαν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν)’. The opposite of this apistia, pistis, is deﬁned
here in very speciﬁc, epistemological vocabulary: ‘trust is civilised, since it is a strong
apprehension, conﬁrming what is assumed (τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀστεῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι γὰρ
ὑπόληψιν ἰσχυράν, βεβαιοῦσαν τὸ ὑπολαμβανόμενον)’. Musonius Rufus also empha-
sizes that philosophy alone can teach how to attain a pistis ischura, a strong conviction
about which things are evil and which things do not deserve our fear, because they are
ethically indiﬀerent according to the Stoic theory of value:
Now, since fearlessness and intrepidity and boldness are the product of courage, how else
would a man acquire them than by having a ﬁrm conviction that death and hardships are
not evils (ἢ εἴ τις περὶ θανάτου καὶ πόνου λάβοι πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν ὡς οὐ κακοῖν ὄντοιν
αὐτοῖν)? For these are the things, death and hardships, I repeat, which unbalance and
frighten men when they believe that they are evils (ὅταν ὡς περὶ κακῶν πεπεισμένοι ὦσιν
αὐτῶν); that they are not evils philosophy is the only teacher64.
Pistis here seems to be a quality that represents sound ethical judgment leading to
sound action. This judgment can and must be practised in real life. Epictetus makes use
of the example of a grammarian: if a grammarian is in a habit (ἐθίσῃ) of writing
ungrammatically, his art (τέχνη) will perish. Thus, according to Epictetus, faithful
actions (τα πιστά) strengthen the faithful man (ὁ πιστός), whereas faithless actions
strengthens the faithless man (ὁ ἄπιστος) in his bad behaviour: ‘that is why the
philosophers admonish us not to be satisﬁed with merely learning, but to add thereto
practice (μελέτη) also, and then training (ἄσκησις)’65.
Given the fact that this cultivation of the right disposition is so important, it is not
surprising that the merits of a speciﬁc philosophical school can be measured by the lives
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of its teachers, sages and founders66. Their ēthos proofs their trustworthiness. While
comparing the behavioural merits of Epicureans, Peripatetics and Stoics, Epictetus
challenges his public: ‘show me a man fashioned according to the dogma’s which he
utters’67. Similarly, in an ironical portrait of an orator who thinks he is doing well
because of the ﬂattery of his disciples, he points out what an earnest searcher would be
looking for: someone ‘who will teach him how he ought to live (πῶς δεῖ βιοῦν)’, who is
‘respectful (αἰδήμων), faithful (πιστός) and unperturbed (ἀτάραχος)’68. Other schools
are criticized for the lack of congruity between words and deeds. Especially the manner
of one’s death was deemed informative. Cicero is all too happy to cite Epicurus’ last
words: ‘to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles (ut
intellegas facta eius cum dictis discrepare)’69. Hence, the consistency of life and learning,
culminating in a trustworthy disposition, is the quality par excellence upon which
philosophers ought to be judged70.
The process of imitating a master whom you know personally is continued when the
student, in turn, becomes the exemplar. This is aptly phrased in the letter of comfort
sent by the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry to his wife Marcella, a source that is of
considerable later date than our main period of interest (1st century BCE–2nd CE), yet
whose language indicates how pistis became more and more embedded in the con-
ceptual ﬁeld of philosophical imitation. Porphyry reminds her of the words spoken at
her initiation into ‘true philosophy’ and counsels to act upon these words. For, so he
writes, ‘it is a man’s actions that naturally aﬀord demonstrations of his opinions, and
whoever holds a belief (ὅστις ἐπίστευσεν) must live in accordance with it, in order that
he may himself be a faithful witness (πιστός μάρτυς) to his disciples of his words’71.
Having trust, or, put more cognitively, a belief, in something should change a master’s
behaviour, which in turn shows trustworthiness towards students. Thus, a ‘chain of
imitations’ emerges, with pistis functioning as both quality of the ‘links’ and relation-
ship between diﬀerent ‘links’. The trustworthiness or credibility of the model (its
disposition) should generate trust or credence in the imitators (an attitude), who
ought to become trustworthy (qua disposition) themselves. According to a variety of
philosophical traditions, at the origin of such a chain, a place was reserved for the gods.
4. Homoiōsis sophōi and homoiōsis theōi: Platonists, Stoics and Epicureans
on assimilation to the divine
Before we return to Paul and his Pistis Christou language, there is one even more
speciﬁc philosophical topos that increases the relevance of this philosophical context
we just discussed. For according to the majority of philosophical schools in the days
of Paul, it was not only in the imitation of school leaders that this trustworthy
disposition could be attained, ultimately, the goal of ethics was to become like, or
assimilate to, the divine nature. This ideal of assimilating to the divine (ὁμοίωσις
Θεῷ) is a motive that occurs throughout the Platonic oeuvre in contexts of physics,
epistemology, and ethics72. In his emphasis on moral instead of martial divine
qualities, Plato’s ideal of assimilation to God can be considered ‘a way to philosophi-
cally redescribe – or if you will, demythologize – the old heroic ideal of deifying
virtue’73. After Plato, it was embraced by a large scope of philosophical traditions
including Stoics and Epicureans, with some diﬀerent emphases, as the sources I will
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discuss below conﬁrm. Still, it was not until relatively recent that this pattern of
‘becoming like the gods’ gained a considerable amount of scholarly attention74.
The early Stoics already internalized and ‘cognitivized’ the relationship with the gods
by redeﬁning the condition of being the gods’ enemy or friend as one of asymphonia or
dichonoia and symphonia or homonoia, harmony or oneness of mind, respectively75.
According to Epictetus, Zeno had formulated the ‘chief doctrine of the philosophers’ in
this manner: ‘To follow the gods is man’s end (τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς), and the
essence of good is the proper use of external impressions’76. Epicurus writes that the
gods ‘are always favourable to their own good qualities (ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ
παντὸς ἀρεταῖς) and take pleasure in men like unto themselves (τοὺς ὁμοίους
ἀποδέχονται), but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind’77. Yet the expression
that homoiōsis theōi is the telos of ethics seems to occur for the ﬁrst time in the early
imperialistic period, in a text by the Stoic Arius Didymus in which he appears to rely on
the Platonist Eudorus78. According to Didymus, Plato and Socrates followed Pythagoras
in this teaching79, but Plato added the disclaimer that we can only resemble God ‘so far
as possible’80. It is taken over as such by later authors like Alcinous and Diogenes
Laertius, which suggests that was widely known in the imperial period.
In the literature on the topos of homoiōsis theōi, two claims on diﬀerences between
schools stand out, which are helpful to eventually situate Paul’s conceptions in this
playﬁeld. The main apples of discord seem to be related to the amount of dissimilarity
between divinity and humanity and, somewhat related, to the usefulness of following
human examples. In the Platonist outlook, the process of assimilating to God may be
understood in terms of a transcendent movement beyond earthly standards. In the
Laws, homoiōsis theōi is explicitly set against the Protagorean adage that man is the
measure of all things:
In our eyes God will be ‘the measure of all things’ in the highest degree (θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων
χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα) – a degree much higher than is any ‘man’ they talk of.
He, then, that is to become dear to such an one must needs become, so far as he possibly
can, of a like character (εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον
γίγνεσθαι)81.
The highest aim for humans, so this passage suggests, lies in becoming as far as possible
like this divine measure. Here, some important philosophical successors and competi-
tors of Plato seem to diverge. In the words of Julia Annas, ‘the alternative ancient
tradition, that of Aristotle (in the main) and the Stoics and Epicureans, who see our
ﬁnal end as lying in the fulﬁlling of human nature, rather than in an attempt to become
some other kind of thing’82. Similarly, René Brouwer states, ‘For Plato, the good life
consists in becoming like god so far as is possible for a human being (…), for the Stoics
the ideal is to become god in the sense of becoming part of the divine power that
structures the world’83.
The question is if this diﬀerence is not overstated, does Plato’s language of
assimilation to God imply some mystical ﬂight from this world, to become more-
than-human?84 Do Stoics and Epicureans leave no distance between the divine and
the humane by completely ‘immanentizing’ the former in the latter? According to
Plato, such assimilation is simply the consequence of enjoying fellowship (homilein)
with God85. The ‘measure of God’ is not set against any proto-Stoic account, but
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against Plato’s sophistic contemporaries, who were moral relativists, in Pauline
words ‘measuring themselves by themselves’86. In fact, especially in the Laws but
also in the Republic, the ideal of godlikeness is not reserved for guardians or
philosophers, yet put to full, worldly use in educating all citizens87. On the other
side of the spectrum, the possibility of indeed ‘fulﬁlling human nature’ was only
realized ‘so far as is possible’ as well. The bold Stoic notion of simply ‘becoming
God’ was somewhat relativized by the scarcity of such divine men88. Epictetus dears
his public to show him ‘a man who has set his heart upon changing from a man into
a god’, yet concludes ‘Show him to me! But you cannot’89. And Platonists could in
the end be just as bold. Maximus of Tyre emphasizes the likeness between humanity
and divinity. The soul of man is ‘something very close to God and like him in its
nature (ἐγγύτατον θεῷ καὶ ἐμφερέστατον)’90. Furthermore, according to the second
century rhetorician, it is untrue that they diﬀer in trustworthiness, human intellect
being apistos, while the divine is pistos: ‘Divine prophetic powers and human
intellect – this is a daring thing to say, but I will say it none the less – are kindred
faculties; if anything at all resembles anything else, then there is nothing more
similar to divine intellect than human excellence’91. Accordingly, Alcinous views
homoiōsis pros to theion as a nothing other than the state of the human soul called
wisdom (φρόνησις)92. Still, this ‘Middle Platonist’ does separate the worldly from the
ultimate reality by distinguishing between the ‘God above the heavens, who does not
possess virtue’, and the ‘God in the heavens’ who apparently does rendering him the
proper object of assimilation93. This perspective on homoiōsis is very much like that
of the Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria, who also claims that ‘nothing earth-born
is more like God than man’ yet limits assimilation to the Logos or second God94.
This Logos performs an intermediary’s function: to ‘separate the creature from the
Creator’ while being a surety to both sides95:
to the parent, pledging (πρὸς πίστιν) the creature that it should never altogether rebel
against the rein and choose disorder rather than order; to the child, warranting his hopes
(πρὸς εὐελπιστίαν) that the merciful God will never forget His own work96.
Platonic homoiōsis thus both upholds and bridges the distance to the transcendent God,
and the reiﬁed usage of pistis here as ‘guarantee’ is the means by which the distance is
bridged.
There is some mysticism involved, however, in Stoic accounts on homoiōsis as well,
yet not so much in the form of a movement from earth to heaven, as in one from
heaven to earth. The closeness of God and humanity is not merely an abstract convic-
tion, it is of actual assistance in the process of cultivating the divine character. The
words of Seneca sound reminiscent of metaphors and parables from the New
Testament, when he explains the working of this process as something eﬀected by
God in us:
Do you marvel that man goes to the gods? God comes to men; nay, he comes nearer – he
comes into men (in homines venit). No mind that has not God, is good (nulla sine deo
mens bona est). Divine seeds are scattered throughout our mortal bodies (semina in
corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt); if a good cultivator (bonus cultor)97 receives
them, they spring up in the likeness of their source and of a parity with those from which
they came (similia origini prodeunt et paria iis, ex quibus orta sunt, surgunt). If, however,
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the cultivator be bad, like a barren or marshy soil, he kills the seeds, and causes tares to
grow up instead of wheat98.
Though the language of ‘becoming like God’ may sound suspicious to Lutheran
theologians, we learn here that homoiōsis theōi is not necessarily conceived of as a
construct based on human eﬀort or merit. Seneca explicitly opposes the eﬀort of cultic
worship to an indwelling of God or his spirit and concludes that ‘no man can be good
without the help of God’99. At the same time, our being good is what pleases the gods:
‘whoever imitates them, is worshipping them suﬃciently (satis illos coluit, quisquis
imitatus est)’100. So, the aim of equality to God does not preclude viewing God and
man as separate entities either helping or worshipping the other in imitation. All in all,
to come back to our initial question, the diﬀerences between Platonism and Stoicism are
subtle, not well caught in sweeping statements of essentially diﬀerent orientations.
The second issue responsible for some variation in positions among schools is the
relationship between imitating God and imitating human examples of virtue. In his
article ‘Epicurus as Deus Mortalis: Homoiosis Theoi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation’,
Michael Erler explaines how in this tradition ‘[h]omoiosis theoi becomes ὁμοίοσις
σοφῷ’101 and places this in a wider polemical context:
To present a perfected moral self as an example to be imitated was obviously to take a
stance on an issue that was controversial between the schools. Plato and his pupils did not
accept that homoiosis of a mortal σοφός can be as useful as homoiosis theoi for achieving
moral excellence. As Plato says in the Laws: ‘Not man, but god is the measure of all things’.
Later Platonists followed him in this102.
This thesis seems to be in need of some reﬁnement. Erler refers to the anonymous
Commentary to the Theaetetus and to Plotinus for this later Platonist debate and
suggests that it ‘documents a discussion that went on in the ﬁrst century BC’103.
Whether or not these references are enough to substantiate his claim, the Laws’ passage
does not so much imply that imitation of humans per se is undesirable as voice anti-
sophistic concerns104. Moreover, both the Laws and the Republic show Plato’s vision for
a whole society aimed at attaining divine virtue by means of virtuous leadership105.
Later Platonists were at the very least not univocal in their scepticism towards human
examples. In a tract that preﬁgures the later ‘mirror for princes’ tradition, Plutarch
presents the ruler as ‘image of God (εἰκὼν θεοῦ)’ who ‘by his virtue forms himself in the
likeness of God (αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι᾿ ἀρετῆς)’, he ‘must regulate his own
soul and establish his own character (τὸ ἦθος), then make his subjects ﬁt his pattern
(οὕτω συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον)’106.
To understand the diﬀerences involved, it is useful to have a look at one particular
Platonic treatise that is perhaps less well known in this context but harbours an
abundance of homoiōsis vocabulary: the Phaedrus. This dialogue oﬀers rich imagery
to show that appropriation of this virtue is eﬀected by following in a chain of mimetic
love. In a parable on the immortality of the soul, Zeus is pictured as leading a giant
procession of gods and spirits (246e–247a) in the shape of chariots towards the heavens
to behold justice, temperance and knowledge as they are. In this, they are followed by
other souls, who barely see these realities from below, since they struggle to restrain
their horses, yet ‘that which best follows after God and is most like him’ (248a) might
see some glimpses and when this soul ends up being born as a human, it is most likely
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that of a philosopher or lover of beauty (248d). These more excellent human souls
receive from the particular god they follow ‘character and habits, so far as it is possible
for a man to have part in God (τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ᾿ ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ
ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν) and, in their turn, choose a beloved soul to ‘make him, so far as
possible, like their god’ (253a):
[B]y imitating the god themselves (μιμούμενοι αὐτοί) and by persuasion and education
they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god (τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ
ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν)’, so far as each of them can do so
(ὅση ἑκάστῳ δύναμις); so that they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one,
but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god (εἰς
ὁμοιότητα αὑτοῖς τῷ θεῷ) whom they honour107.
The usefulness of several layers of mediators, lower divinities and philosophers,
between Zeus and the ‘beloved disciple’, is evident from this account. So, whether in
the setting of a city-state or in the setting of philosophical education, the Platonic
tradition oﬀers ample material to allow for interhuman imitation, as a ﬁrst step in
approaching the excellence of the gods. Plato’s perspective here, however, shows that he
envisions homoiōsis to be part of the immortal soul’s progress, whereas the Epicurean
materialistic stance on the cosmos, including the gods, did not allow for such immater-
ial suppositions, rendering their idea of assimilation to the divine of the mortal human
being highly optimistic or even hubristic in Platonic eyes. Furthermore, the love the
souls in the Phaedrus feel for the god they follow immediately translates in the desire to
actively teach others to become likewise. By contrast, as Erler himself argues, Epicurus’
care for others was only secondary in nature, by merely providing them with an
example of human perfection108. All in all, the main diﬀerence between the
Epicurean and Platonic homoiōsis traditions, so it seems, does not lie in the endorse-
ment of human intermediaries, but rather in the optimism about reaching the divine
level from a mortal body and in the motivation of sages to help others reach their level
of assimilation.
One matter has thus far been left unexplored: can we connect this tradition of
homoiōsis theōi to the vocabulary of pistis, ﬁdes and cognates? We have discussed
various examples of these word stems in connection to the practise of philosophical
imitation in the previous paragraph; what about the discourse of likeness to God or the
divine in general? In passing, we already saw Maximus of Tyre liken human trust-
worthiness to divine trustworthiness – or lack thereof – especially in the context of
oracles. Yet, there are more poignant examples across the philosophical spectre109.
Even though pistis is not a frequently praised virtue in Plato’s oeuvre, as an attitude
or action it is used in the direct context of a homoiōsis theōi passage in book VI of the
Republic. The subject of the discussion is whether the majority will be able to set aside
their prejudice (διαβολή) as regards philosophers as guardians so that the state can
indeed be modelled after the divine. A philosopher is described as someone who ‘allies
himself with the divine and orderly becomes divine and orderly, as far as is possible for
a human being’ and thereupon feels urged ‘to put into practice what he sees in the
divine realm in the private and public lives of men, and to mold not just his own
character (ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν)’ but become
a ‘creator of righteousness, temperance, and any other kind of virtue (δημιουργὸν (…)
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σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς)’110. Then, the
question posed is
But if the majority (οἱ πολλοὶ) see that we are telling the truth about him [i.e. the
philosopher], will they get irritated with philosophers and refuse to believe us
(ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν) when we say that a state would never otherwise be successful, unless
artists portray it using some divine model (τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι)?111
Faith in the philosophers, instead of prejudice, is a requirement in this reasoning for
initiating the process of reforming a state according to the divine paradigm. Pistis
sophōi, trust in the homoiōsis theōi of the wise, precedes a similar homoiōsis for the
common people (hoi polloi). So, even though pistis does not function as a virtue to
imitate, it is the proper attitude towards the philosophers, who act as intermediaries in
assimilation to God.
In the Roman context, where Fides was worshipped as a prominent goddess112, it
was also possible to speak of a transference of the divine quality of faith into human
minds. This is what we encounter in the crucial episode of Silius Italicus’ epic Punica, at
the point when Saguntum is sieged by the Carthaginians. Mercury pleads with Fides to
intercede on behalf of the city and addresses Fides as ‘Goddess more ancient than
Jupiter, glory of gods and men, without whom neither sea nor land ﬁnds peace, sister of
Justice, silent divinity in the heart (in pectore) of man’113. She allows herself to be
convinced to end her self-chosen exile from earth in order to give a ﬁnal boost of faith
to the struggling inhabitants of Saguntum:
Taking possession of their minds and pervading their breasts, her familiar habitation
(invadit mentes et pectora nota pererrat), she instilled her divine power into their hearts
(immittitque animis numen). Then, piercing even to their marrow, she ﬁlled them with a
burning passion for herself (atque sui ﬂagrantem inspirat amorem)114.
What is especially noteworthy is the repeated connection between Fides and the
human mind, breast and heart. Notwithstanding her long absence as a virtue and the
ﬂourishing impiety she laments (494–506), she represents an aﬃnity between the
divine and the humane. The eﬀect of her dramatic descent is an instilment of the
same virtue she represents, opening up the possibility of the citizens to enact faith
again.
Even more explicitly, Epictetus names being pistos as the ﬁrst divine quality that
comes to mind as suitable for human imitation. When describing what is the proprium
of philosophy, as opposed to something like carpentry, he argues one ﬁrst ought to
learn something (μαθών τινα), before putting it to work, and in the case of philosophy,
this has to do with the existence and nature of the gods:
Now the philosophers say that the ﬁrst thing we must learn (μαθεῖν) is this: That there is a
God (ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς), and that He provides for the universe, and that it is impossible for a
man to conceal from Him, not merely his actions, but even his purposes and his thoughts
(διανοούμενον). Next we must learn what the gods are like (ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν); for whatever
their character is discovered to be, the man who is going to please and obey them must
endeavour as best he can to resemble them (ἀνάγκη πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι
ἐκείνοις). If the deity is faithful, he also must be faithful (εἰ πιστόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, καὶ
τοῦτον εἶναι πιστόν); if free, he also must be free; if beneﬁcent, he also must be beneﬁcent;
if high-minded, he also must be high-minded, and so forth; therefore, in everything he says
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and does, he must act as an imitator of God (ὡς θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς πάντα καὶ
ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν)115.
In this brief capitulation of the importance of imitation of the divine for the philoso-
phical enterprise, Epictetus considers the cultivation of faithfulness essential to gaining
the right disposition (hexis). As we saw above, being pistos is an important quality to
Epictetus, a quality that is divine precisely because it is not dependent on external
circumstances: practising pistis, one is able to die like a God, bear disease like a God
(ἀποθνῄσκοντα θείως, νοσοῦντα θείως)116. At the same time, though, he considers it a
divine command:
Your faithfulness is your own (τὸ πιστὸν σόν), your self-respect is your own; who, then,
can take these things from you? (…) Since you have such promptings and directions
(ὑποθήκας καὶ ἐντολὰς) from Zeus, what kind do you still want from me? Am I greater
than he, or more trustworthy (ἀξιοπιστότερος)? But if you keep these commands of his, do
you need any others besides?
The ﬂexibility in Epictetus’ usage of pistis language is perfectly illustrated in this
passage, as it is used ﬁrst as a quality, and thereafter as an attitude towards either
him or Zeus: whom would you rather trust, who is, literally, more worthy of your pistis?
Evidently, the sage or teacher loses out to the god. According to Epictetus, however, the
virtue of faithfulness does not consist in this attitude towards Zeus, but in putting Gods’
directions into practice.
These examples show that when Christians in the early empire would speak of the
importance of the virtue of faithfulness, or about the trust they put in their leaders, in
Christ, in God, and of the trustworthiness of these ‘objects of trust’, worthy of their
imitation, it was unproblematically understood by their pagan contemporaries. Still, for
the prominence of the virtue of pistis as a quality of men and attitude towards God at
the same time, we must turn to a Jewish-Hellenistic version of the Platonic and Stoic
philosophical traditions. In Philo’s works, pistis is most commonly used in a reiﬁed
sense, denoting ‘proof’, ‘pledge’ or ‘evidence’117. Additionally, it is also frequently used
as a virtue in its own right, usually in connection with Septuagint passages that concern
Abraham or Moses118. It represents the virtue of stability, certainty, trustworthiness
and, as a virtue, it consists precisely in an action or attitude of trust, for it must be
placed in the right, trustworthy object:
To purge away each of these, to distrust created being, which in itself is wholly unworthy
of trust (ἀπιστῆσαι γενέσει τῇ πάντα ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀπίστῳ), to trust in God, and in Him alone,
even as He alone is truly worthy of trust (μόνῳ δὲ πιστεῦσαι θεῷ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν μόνῳ
πιστῷ) – this is a task for a great and celestial understanding (…)119
While he adapts the Platonic epistemological division to allow for pistis to refer to the
intelligible as well, he is perfectly in line with Platonism in juxtaposing the sensible and
the eternal realm, with the Delphic maxims in distrusting worldly goods, and with
Stoicism in regarding pistis an important quality of the sage who is not distracted by
indiﬀerent externals. The novelty in Philo’s use of pistis lies in juxtaposing Abraham’s
attitude faith in the eternal God to faith in sensibles, thus identifying the action or
attitude of trusting with the virtue of trust and trustworthiness. The virtue of pistis
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consists in trusting in accordance with the trustworthiness of the object, and, so we will
see, even in becoming trustworthy by association.
For even as in Philo, homoiosis theōi as a topic per se is never discussed in terms of
pistis, he come close to suggesting that we ought to imitate God’s pistis. Moses was a
‘wise man (sophos)’ because he had the privilege to ‘stand’ with God (Deut 5.31),
understood as a means to ‘put oﬀ doubt and hesitation, the qualities of the unstable
mind (ἵνα ἐνδοιασμὸν καὶ ἐπαμφοτερισμόν, ἀβεβαίου ψυχῆς διαθέσεις ἀποδυσάμενος),
and put on that surest and most stable quality, faith (καὶ βεβαιοτάτην διάθεσιν, πίστιν,
ἐνδύσηται)’120. So in God’s presence, Moses is able to cloth himself with the divine
stability, whose corollary, at least on the human side, is pistis121. As we will see below,
this vocabulary of clothing will also be used by Paul to explicate imitation of the divine.
Yet even more strikingly, Philo also calls pistis a quality that belongs to God, and that is
precisely why the human variant is essentially diﬀerent: it imitates divine pistis, yet will
always remain an image of the divine archetype122:
Such a person asserts that the faith which man possesses should be so strong as to diﬀer
not at all from the faith which belongs to the Existent (τὴν γὰρ πίστιν, ἧς ἔλαχεν
ἄνθρωπος, οὕτω βέβαιόν φησι δεῖν εἶναι, ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν τῆς περὶ τὸ ὄν), a faith
sound and complete in every way. (…) Enough for man is the power to possess the images
of these (εἰκόνας αὐτῶν), images in the scale of number and magnitude far below the
archetypes (τῶν ἀρχετύπων ἐλαττουμένας)123.
Philo thus grounds the relationship of human and divine pistis in the ontological or
even cosmological relationship of copy to original, image to example. Such a relation-
ship is not a static one according to Middle Platonist thought: the original grounds the
existence of the image and shows what it can potentially become; it even acts as a cause
eﬃciens leading the image in this direction124. As a copy of divine pistis, Abraham’s
pistis is essentially weaker, but it strives towards becoming like the perfect original. So,
to sum up, by presenting Abraham and Moses as the ultimate examples of both the
cognitive quality of unwavering faith and the attitude of trust, placed in the ultimate
trustworthy object, i.e. God, Philo makes the utmost use of the multivalence of pistis
language. Moreover, even though Philo does not connect homoiōsis theōi to pistis
explicitly, by connecting Moses’ stable faith to God’s stability and by comparing
human to divine pistis, we see the basic contours of the idea of assimilation to God
in the quality of pistis.
5. Interhuman imitation in faith(fulness) in the Pauline communities
Before returning to the subject we started oﬀ with, Paul’s ambiguous pistis Christou
formulations, we ought to account for the relevance of our ‘stage’ of imitation in faith
for understanding the Pauline letters. Whereas it needs no reaﬃrmation that Paul
partakes in a discourse of imitation125, and while the importance of pistis-vocabulary
to the Pauline gospel may be evident, can we also ﬁnd uses of pistis either as quality to
be imitated or as attitude facilitating such imitation? In what follows, I will brieﬂy refer
to a number of passages to support my thesis that we indeed can, without aiming to
oﬀer a comprehensive exegesis.
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An explicit admonition to imitate the faithfulness of another person or of Christ
himself, a nice phrase like ‘imitate my pistis in Christ, as I imitate his pistis in God’ or
something similar is lacking in the extant Pauline letters. In the early Christian tradi-
tion, it was not uncommon, however, to speak of imitation of another’s pistis. The
Letter to the Hebrews echoes precisely this focus we saw in Greco-Roman sources on the
importance of lived examples, including the lived faith of their leaders: ‘Remember
(Μνημονεύετε) your leaders, those who spoke the word of God to you; consider the
outcome of their way of life (ὧν ἀναθεωροῦντες τὴν ἔκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς), and
imitate their faith (μιμεῖσθε τὴν πίστιν)’126. But also in the Pauline letters, pistis plays a
part in several interhuman relationships of imitation, as well as in the Christ–follower’s
relationship to Christ, as will be made clear in the next section. As for the imitation of
human examples, it is noteworthy that here pistis-vocabulary pertains to imitation of
faith or faithfulness as a dispositional quality, and not to a faith as the attitude enabling
a relationship of imitation. Like Philo, Paul obviously employs Abraham as a prototype,
as the father of all the faithful: circumcized and uncircumcized ‘follow in the footsteps’
of this narrative and historical exemplum of pistis that is speciﬁed as ‘with and without
foreskin’ (Rom 4.11–12). The presentation of Abraham as father ﬁts the general Roman
pattern of mimicking the civic virtue of the great ancestors.
Yet apart from this more abstract usage of imitation, it is also possible to speak of a
mimetic chain in the Pauline network of communities in analogy to the master–student
relationships we discussed in Hellenistic philosophy. Given the many admonitions and
thanksgivings referring to it, the strength or ﬁrmness of the pistis of his addressees is of
continuous concern to Paul. It is the one thing he appears to be most interested about,
when informing after the well-being of the communities he founded and visited (Phil
1.27; 1 Thes 3.5). They are continuously reminded to stand ﬁrm or praised for standing
ﬁrm in or by their pistis (1 Cor 16.13; 2 Cor 1.24; Rom 11.20) which seems to stand in a
paradigmatic relation to standing in the Lord (1 Thes 3.8; cf. Col 2.5). The vocabulary
involved suggests that pistis is something in respect of which a community can not only
stand but also be strengthened or encouraged (1 Thes 3.2: τὸ στηρίξαι ὑμᾶς καὶ
παρακαλέσαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν) and even something capable of increasing or
growing (Phil 1.25: προκοπὴν (…) τῆς πίστεως127; 2 Cor 10.15: αὐξανομένης τῆς
πίστεως ὑμῶν) or, even more speciﬁc, of being perfected when lacking (1 Thes 3.10:
καταρτίσαι τὰ ὑστερήματα τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν). The reverse is also possible, since
ﬁrmness of faith(fullness) is threatened by testing (peirázō, 1 Thes 3.5) or tribulation
(thlipsis, 1 Thes 3.3) and may be weakened by distrust (apistia, Rom 4.20; Rom 11.20).
All this shows that pistis comes in degrees, and that Paul and his companions, like
Timothy, are given the position of a teacher or even ‘father/brother’ sponsoring this
faith(fullness). To fulﬁl this position adequately, however, a teacher must of course be
trustworthy (pistos) himself, so that he is worthy of imitation128:
Indeed, in Christ Jesus I became your father through the gospel. I appeal to you, then,
be imitators of me (μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε). For this reason I sent you Timothy, who is
my beloved and faithful child in the Lord (τέκνον ἀγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν ἐν κυρίῳ), to
remind you of my ways in Christ Jesus (ὃς ὑμᾶς ἀναμνήσει τὰς ὁδούς μου τὰς ἐν
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ), as I teach them everywhere in every church (καθὼς πανταχοῦ ἐν πάσῃ
ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω)129.
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If we analyse this according to our ‘mimetic chain-model’, no less than four ‘shackles’
can be distinguished: Christ, Paul, Timothy and the addressed community. In calling
his teachings literally ‘ways’ that can be refreshed by another’s presence, both the
practical nature of these teachings and the transferral by means of stepwise imitation
are made apparent.
In the beginning of 1 Thessalonians, it becomes clear that imitation not only
functions in top-down structures headed by Paul, but that the collective faith(fulness)
of his addressees is an example to other Christ-communities. In the thanksgiving
section, Paul starts by praising the Thessalonians’ ‘work of faith(fulness)’, fully acknowl-
edging the exercise it involves, similar to acquiring a philosophical disposition, to
continue with describing various mimetic relationships:
And you became imitators of us and of the Lord (ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ
κυρίου), for in spite of persecution you received the word with joy inspired by the Holy
Spirit, so that you became an example to all the believers in Macedonia and in Achaia
(ὥστε γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς τύπον πᾶσιν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐν τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ). For
the word of the Lord has sounded forth from you not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but
in every place where your faith in God has become known (ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν ἡ
πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐξελήλυθεν), so that we have no need to speak about it130.
Here, Paul speaks of Christ, himself and the addressees as being successive models for
imitation. In this mimetic chain, the Thessalonians in their turn became an example
(tupos) to ‘the believers’131: a participle that might simply be a common, unmarked
designation, yet, considering the early date of this letter, could also be argued to carry
the ‘thicker’ meaning of ‘those who have placed their trust in God, in Christ and/or in
his followers’. Anyhow, as the ﬁnal quoted sentence conﬁrms, it is their trust in God
that is exemplary so that it speaks louder than words.
6. Imitation of Christ by and in faith(fulness) in the Pauline letters
When Paul speaks of his and his addressees’ faith in relation to Christ, most of the
times, this faith is not the content or imitandum but the means by which the imitation
takes place132. First of all, Paul repeatedly expresses the content of faith in terms of
imitation of Christ’s death and resurrection. ‘But if we have died with Christ, we believe
that (πιστεύομεν ὅτι) we will also live with him’133. ‘For since we believe that
(πιστεύομεν ὅτι) Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring
with him those who have died’134. These short credo’s imply not merely a cognitive
assent to ‘articles of faith’, as the form ‘believe that’ may suggest, but a conviction or
trust that radically alters their mode of life, as it is now linked to Christ’s. Whereas
assent can be merely on the lips, faith in Christ’s resurrection has to take hold in the
heart so that a person can be made righteous135. The imitation is expressed even more
strongly in terms of assimilation in the expression ‘in him we might become the
righteousness of God (ἡμεῖς γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ)’136. Paul’s aim is to
‘give birth to his children’ as people in whom Christ is formed137. However, if the
model after which they are formed is not vindicated or has not achieved perfection by
being resurrected, this pistis is ‘in vain (κενὴ)’ or ‘pointless (ματαία)’, for then they
cannot count on being resurrected and perfected themselves138. This is reminiscent of
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the concern of the philosophical searcher, hoping to ﬁnd a teacher whose life and death
express his or her convictions, even though the idea of imitation in resurrection would
cause some eyebrows to be raised. Pistis seems to be more of an attitude than a quality
in the instances discussed so far, for it is either explicitly directed to Christ and his
resurrection as its object, or implicitly linked to his perfection, so that without this link
it is useless. Adversely, Epictetus would never consider one’s faithful disposition as
useless, for it is not dependent for its value on any external including its model.
Nevertheless, it is very much in convergence with Platonist ontology, according to
which Form and particular exist in a mimetic relationship, the image being dependent
for its very being on the original in which it participates139.
An even stronger connection between pistis and this Christ-formed life can be found
in utterances that are responsible for labelling Paul a mystic140. Paul repeatedly speaks
of living ‘in Christ’, ‘in the Lord’ or ‘in him’ and, conversely, though less often, of Christ
living in him141. In these phrases, pistis is used in paradigmatic relation to Christ, both
with the same preposition (ἐν) as near equivalents. In 2 Corinthians, we read the
exhortation, ‘Examine yourselves to see whether you are living in the faith (εἰ ἐστὲ ἐν
τῇ πίστει). Test yourselves. Do you not realize that Jesus Christ is in you (ὅτι Ἰησοῦς
Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν)? – unless, indeed, you fail to pass the test!’142 Similarly, from the letter
to the Galatians, ‘it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the ﬂesh I live by
faith in/of the Son of God (ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ) (…)’. This last instance of
pistis is one of the pistis Christou formulations, to which I shall return in the next
paragraph, yet for now it suﬃces to point out that ‘living in pistis’ is used to explicate
the phenomenon of Christ living in his followers. Oﬀ course, Hellenistic-Jewish notions
of the divine wisdom indwelling in human beings highlight a relevant context for this
vocabulary, yet the parallel with Seneca’s ‘intervening’ God is perhaps even more
adequate, since it shares the same reciprocity inherent to these Pauline expressions143.
Seneca’s God comes not only near, but also inside people in the form of divine seeds
that, if cultivated, spring up in the likeness of their source. Accordingly, in Paul, the
believer being in Christ is simultaneously Christ dwelling in the believer, which eﬀects
this ‘belief’ to be more than an outward-facing, trusting attitude. Pistis, in these
instances, seems to also stand for Christ’s faithful disposition that is appropriated in
the lives of his followers: it springs up in Christ’s likeness. Accordingly, acting accord-
ing to faith is acting like God or Christ, as for instance in the admonition to ‘welcome
him who is weak according to faith (Rom 14.1: τὸν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει
προσλαμβάνεσθε), with the rationale that ‘God has welcomed him’ (14.3), a theme
upon which later on the variation is made to ‘welcome one another, just as Christ has
welcomed you’ (Rom 15.7: προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς
προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς). ‘In faith’ or ‘according to faith’ is here shorthand for the attitude
towards Christ that simultaneously appropriates his faithful behaviour.
There is an interesting text from the pastoral epistles that support the possibility of
pistis as referring to Christ’s faithfulness, which draws an analogy between Christ and
the human imitator. Introduced by the technical introduction, ‘this teaching is
trustworthy (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος)’, the conditions are put forward that if the human
‘we’ is like Christ in his death and enduring, so also in his life and reigning. But it
becomes interesting if this ‘we’ deviates from the pattern of imitation: in case of a
denial, this is again mirrored by a denial of Christ, yet if ‘we’ are being unfaithful (εἰ
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ἀπιστοῦμεν), the pattern is interrupted: ‘he remains faithful (ἐκεῖνος πιστὸς μένει) –
for he cannot deny himself’144. This demonstrates that for one, also in the days in
which the pastorals were written, the language of imitation was still prevalent. What is
more, the consequences of each one’s role in this imitation were being thought
through: as a model, Christ could interact with his imitators, but not to the point
of abnegating his own virtue. Finally, we learn that according to the author, who
probably reﬂects on a wider known teaching, Christ is pistos, so much so that it is an
undeniable, inseparable part of his disposition145. And this faithfulness of Christ is
thought of in a context where a relationship of imitation is the topic under
consideration.
So, we have seen that in the position of the Christ–follower, pistis can refer to both
the attitude of faith, trust, belief, conviction directed at Christ and the quality of
faithfulness, trustworthiness, loyalty modelled after Christ. Now, the question left in
the minds of those at home in the pistis Christou debate is did Paul also think of Christ
as having an attitude of faith in God? Based solely on the starting point of ‘sustained
ambiguity’, there is no reason to separate his being ﬁlled with faith from his faithful-
ness. Yet, there even is some textual evidence that suggests that Christ was indeed
thought of as having beliefs and that his followers imitate these beliefs as well. In an
insightful article modestly titled ‘2 Corinthians and the Πίστις Χρίστου Debate’ (pur-
posefully diﬀerent from all the ‘neglected evidence’ variants), Kenneth Schenck draws
attention to Paul’s citation from the Psalms146:
But just as we have the same spirit of faith (τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως) that is in
accordance with scripture – ‘I believed, and so I spoke (Ἐπίστευσα, διὸ ἐλάλησα)’ – we also
believe (πιστεύομεν), and so we speak, because we know that the one who raised the Lord
Jesus will raise us also with Jesus (…)147
Schenck argues that if we try to capture the logic behind Paul’s reasoning, it makes
most sense that Paul understood this quote to be voiced by Christ, and not in the ﬁrst
place, as is often assumed, by the Psalmist, rendering Paul’s own belief an imitation of
Christ’s belief that God would resurrect him148. While Schenck hence repeatedly speaks
of ‘Jesus’ faith as exemplary for human faith’, he never explores the wider context of the
imitation motive in Paul, let alone his cultural surroundings149. Yet, as is hopefully
suﬃciently clear by now, from the background of practising philosophy, imitation of a
master in character, mind, faith and even speech was considered indispensable.
7. Mediated imitation of God as cultural model for Paul’s Pistis Christou
formulations
In the ﬁnale of this article, it seems ﬁtting for God to enter the scene, even as my
argument would win in strength if this entrance would be more organic than ex
machina. How does the divine ﬁt into this evolving scene of student–master–sage
imitation? We have already seen that God is the object of human faith (1 Thes 1.8:
pistis pros ton theon). Is God also viewed as a moral paradigm, particularly so in pistis,
in the Pauline literature?
In contrast to our philosophical references, God is not directly mentioned as the
object of imitation, even though God is regularly praised for being pistos150. On a
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closer look, though, in all four of these cases, the issue at stake is the stability or
perfection of the faithful. At the beginning of 1 Corinthians, this process of perfec-
tion is spoken of in terms of being strengthened by Christ up to the end (1.8) so as
to be irreproachable on the day of the Lord. In this context, it is said that God is
faithful (1.9: πιστὸς ὁ θεὸς). Further on in the letter, they are warned to remain
standing if they are subjected to a test, for ‘God is faithful (πιστὸς δὲ ὁ θεός), and he
will not let you be tested beyond your strength’ (10.13). At the end of 1
Thessalonians, a similar reassurance is given. Paul wishes his addressees to be
sanctiﬁed entirely by God so that their body, mind and spirit are irreproachable
(5.23) at the parousia, which is aﬃrmed by the words ‘[t]he one who calls you is
faithful (πιστὸς ὁ καλῶν ὑμᾶς), and he will do so’ (5.24). The same model can also
be said to apply to the fourth specimen of the adjective pistos, in which Paul appeals
to God’s faithfulness, this time to reaﬃrm his own reliability. In order to explain to
the Corinthians why he had not come to Corinth, he ﬁrst rebuts the complaint of
inconsistency:
As surely as God is faithful (πιστὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὅτι), our word to you has not been ‘yes and
no’. For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, whom we proclaimed among you, Silvanus and
Timothy and I, was not ‘yes and no’, but in him it is always ‘yes’. For in him every one of
God’s promises is a ‘yes’. For this reason it is through him that we say the ‘amen’, to the
glory of God. But it is God who establishes us with you in Christ (ὁ δὲ βεβαιῶν ἡμᾶς σὺν
ὑμῖν εἰς Χριστὸν) (…)151
Duplicity or two-mindedness does not belong either to God, or to those who serve him.
Paul’s call upon God’s faithfulness to establish (bebaioō) his own is wholly under-
standable seen that his own sincerity is in question. Paul involves Jesus Christ as the
fulﬁlment of God’s promises, i.e. God’s ‘yes’ to us, and as the one in whom ‘we’ respond
aﬃrmatively to these promises. Christ is the ﬁrm, unwavering representative of God’s
faithfulness and the representative and guarantee of our ‘amen’ to God. In all four cases,
then, the stability of God, expressed by the adjective pistos, functions not so much as the
model, but rather as guarantee for the stability, trustworthiness and ultimate perfection
of the Christ-community. Imitation of God per se or of God’s pistis is not part of Paul’s
vocabulary.
In implicit and explicit contexts of imitation, we indeed encounter Christ as a
mediating intermediary, comparable to the sophos in Stoicism, the deus mortalis in
Epicureanism and the ‘god in the heavens’ in Middle Platonism. As we argued above, all
school traditions recognized the need for some kind of human example, if only, as in
Platonism, to recall the soul’s own prenatal glimpse of the virtues themselves. Paul too
acknowledges this need when he aﬃrmatively quotes from the book of Isa that
humanity has no access to the ‘mind of the Lord’, yet, he continues, ‘we have the
mind of Christ’152. Mirroring the descent of God or even of Fides to earth and into
human minds in our Greco-Roman sources, Christ is the image of God that came to the
earth, so that humans may share in his divine mind. In his comprehensive study into
language of ‘image of God’ and ‘being made like God’, George van Kooten concludes
that ‘[a]s Christ is the image of God, and man, by becoming of the same form as Christ
participates in this image, the homoiōsis Christōi is the intermediary stage in the process
of assimilation to God’153. To allow for this assimilation, the pre-existent Christ needed
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to take on the ‘likeness of man’ ﬁrst154. This seems to be a move that is unparalleled in
the pagan discourse of homoiōsis, especially in its drastic form of slavery and suﬀering,
although the Platonic variant is closer as regards the other-regarding motivation or
even love of the teacher.
It is from this role of Christ as intermediary in imitation, as image of God’s
faithfulness to humanity and model for human faith in and faithfulness to God at the
same time, that the sustained ambiguity of the pistis Christou phrases is brought to the
fore. It will be the purpose of these ﬁnal paragraphs to brieﬂy discuss how, in at least
three of the four passages in which the seven pistis Christou phrases are used, the
discourse of imitation is present. To be sure, I do not mean to imply that this is a
suﬃcient context for these passages of even for these phrases, since evidently, the
discourse of law, sin and justice plays an important part as well. My aim is, however,
to oﬀer a reading of these passages which connects them to the Mediterranean culture,
more speciﬁcally the philosophical practise and intellectual topos of imitation of each
other, teachers, sages, gods and, ultimately, God.
First, in the Letter to the Philippians, Paul refers to his own righteousness as ‘one that
comes through pistis in/of Christ (τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ), the righteousness from
God based on pistis (τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει)’. He continues by expres-
sing his wish to ‘know Christ and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his
suﬀerings by becoming like him in his death (συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ), if
somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead.’ We already saw that Paul often
expresses belief in this mimetic pattern of sharing in Christ’s life and death and that he
expects this attitude of faith to alter his life and become Christ-like, as a performative,
mimetic act. Attitude, that is faith in Christ, and quality, that is a ‘Christ-like’ faithful
disposition, thus come together in the act of imitation155.
Then, there is the passage we already encountered from the Letter to the
Galatians (2.15–21). The imitation is here evident in the identiﬁcation of Paul
with Christ’s cruciﬁxion, being literally ‘co-cruciﬁed (συνεσταύρωμαι)’, and with
his subsequent life: ‘and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in
me. And the life I now live in the ﬂesh I live by pistis in/of the Son of God (ἐν
πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ), who loved me and gave himself for me’156. The
ambiguity of pistis here can hardly be missed: if Christ lives in ‘me’, then ‘my’ pistis
is his pistis too. Paul’s disposition has been taken up in Christ’s own, characterized
by pistis and self-giving love. At the same time, it is Christ’s trust in God and Paul’s
trust in Christ – ‘we have come to trust in Christ Jesus (εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν
ἐπιστεύσαμεν)’ – that paves the way for this process of imitation.
A little further in the same letter, we read that ‘what was promised through
pistis in/of Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe’157. Not unlike
Italicus’ dramatic return of Fides to the oppressed people on a ‘deﬁled earth
(pollutas (…) terras)’, Pistis also needs to return to ‘all that is under the power
of sin (τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν)’, in order for this transference of faith(fulness) to
be eﬀective, and ‘she’ returns simultaneously with Christ’s coming (3.22–25)158.
The consequences for the believers are further explicated as ‘in Christ you are all
children of God through faith (πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ)’ and you have ‘clothed yourselves with Christ (Χριστὸν
ἐνεδύσασθε)’. Both metaphors are perfectly at home in a mimetic setting: as
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children, you ideally mirror your parents, not your disciplinarian’s, virtue. But
even more so, by putting on another’s cloths, you impersonate his character. This
connection between putting on new clothes and homoiōsis theōi is conﬁrmed by
the deuteropauline tradition: in Ephesians we read how the new life consists being
taught in Jesus (4.21: ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε), and to ‘clothe yourselves with the new
self, created according to the likeness of God (ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον
τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα) in true righteousness and holiness (ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ
ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας)’159. The reference to the virtues of ‘true’ righteousness and
holiness may very well be a play on Plato’s famous homoiōsis passage in the
Theaetetus160. At any rate, this understanding within the ‘Pauline school’ demon-
strates that pistis Christou, imitating Christ by means of and in his pistis, was seen
as an intermediary step in becoming like God, even as to Paul, talk of being
‘modelled after God’ would probably be a bridge to far.
To sum up, we have seen that the idea of moral imitation pervaded the familial,
educational and public spheres of the Roman Empire in the days of Paul, that
imitation between students and masters was considered of paramount importance
in philosophical schools and, most importantly, that in both contexts pistis is used
either referring to a dispositional quality to model one’s character upon or as an
attitude towards a model. Within these philosophical circles, we saw that ‘becoming
like God’ was a widely used ethical aim, to which all traditions in one way or
another invoked the help of lesser divine or higher human intermediaries. One
could even imitate the divine in being pistos or having ﬁdes. In the letters of Paul,
I distinguished between interhuman imitation, human imitation of Christ and
imitation of God. Whereas in interhuman relations, faith is not so much used as
an attitude towards an example, in reference to Christ, pistis-language seems to form
the basis for a relationship of imitation and identiﬁcation, including his faith in
resurrection and faithfulness towards God. Finally, we have argued that God’s own
trustworthiness has everything to do with the human movement towards trust-
worthiness and perfection, yet that imitation of God takes place through the inter-
mediate model of Christ, who actively played the human part, so that we are able to
enact his. In the immediate context of the pistis Christou formulations, we ﬁnd
ample clues to support our claim that the Greco-Roman practice of imitation sets
the stage to understand the ambiguity in these phrases. According to Paul’s mimetic
logic, Christ’s faith and faithfulness has become our faith and faithfulness through
our faith in him.
I will conclude with one more witness to Paul’s legacy of mediated imitation of God.
Roughly two hundred years after Paul, Clement of Alexandria brings together the
platonic ideal of homoiōsis theōi and Paul’s mimetic chain by calling assimilation to
God the ‘aim of faith’:
And openly and expressly the apostle, in the ﬁrst Epistle to the Corinthians, says, ‘Be ye
followers of me, as also I am of Christ,’ in order that that may take place. If ye are of me,
and I am of Christ, then ye are imitators of Christ, and Christ of God. Assimilation to God,
then, so that as far as possible a man becomes righteous and holy with wisdom, he lays
down as the aim of faith, and the end to be that restitution of the promise which is eﬀected
by faith161.
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With this synthesis, Clement made Paul’s participation in the discourse of homoiōsis
theōi and its relation to Paul’s pistis-vocabulary explicit.
Notes
1. The seven occurrences have slight variations: διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Gal 2.16), ἐκ
πίστεως Χριστοῦ (Gal 2.16), ἐν πίστει (…) τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ (Gal 2.20), ἐκ πίστεως
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Gal 3.22), διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ (Phil 3.9), διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
(Rom 3.22), ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ (Rom 3.26).
2. In an exchange of views published in the SBL Symposium Series, both Hays (support-
ing the subjective-genitive reading) and Dunn (supporting the objective-genitive read-
ing) hold that the phrase itself is inconclusive, though each also holds that the outcome
of the grammatical arguments favours his own interpretation. Cf. Hays, “Πίστις and
Pauline Christology,” 39 and James D.G. DUNN, “Once More, ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ,” 67.
3. For an overview of these and other theological concerns, see Hays, “Πίστις and Pauline
Christology,” 55–57.
4. A comprehensive overview of the current situation, including ‘both sides of the story’ is
oﬀered by Bird and Sprinkle, The Faith of Jesus Christ. Ulrichs, Christusglaube is a
recent, profoundly written monograph, ultimately defending the ‘faith in Christ’ posi-
tion, while incorporating New Perspective insights.
5. Cf. the conclusion of an overview of arguments in Easter, “The Pistis Christou Debate,”
42: ‘interpreters resort either intentionally or unintentionally to their larger models for
reading Paul that are already in place.’
6. Granted, this Mediterranean model will form nothing but an even wider circle with the
Pauline material, yet I presume that at least here, the amount and variety of the sources
will leave less room for ideological presuppositions.
7. As formulated literally by Matlock, “The Rhetoric of πίστις,” 177, yet implied by many
others.
8. Hays, “Πίστις and Pauline Christology,” 58. Cf. Hays, The faith of Jesus Christ, 174–175:
‘We should be willing to recognize that Paul’s language may sometimes be ambiguous
by design, allowing him to speak in one breath of Christ’s faith and our faith.’
9. Matlock, “Detheologizing the Pistis Christou Debate,” 16. Cf. Matlock, “Paul and Pistis
Christou,” 315. In support of his approach, Matlock build on linguistic theory as
explained by D.A. Cruse in Lexical Semantics.
10. See Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, 218.
11. Smith, World of the New Testament, 174: ‘understanding a concept does not always
require us to choose one meaning at the expense of another meaning. Sometimes, to
understand pistis in a given context, you need to take into account both senses of the
word: faith and faithfulness.’ Jewett, Romans, 277–278: ‘neither of the strict construals
matches what the original audience would have understood. I wonder whether the
ambiguity may have been intentional on Paul’s part’.
12. Downing, “Ambiguity, Ancient Semantics and Faith,” 160. Cf. Ibid., 155–156: ‘What is
ruled out, then, it is here argued, is any hard precision, any clear lines between possible
connotations of particular words, the kinds of ‘nice’ distinctions desired in some
theological or ideological discourse. In interpreting sympathetically our ancient texts
it will, rather and almost inevitably, be a matter of discerning family resemblances
among uses of particular lexemes.’
13. Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 273, 274.
14. That Paul exploits the ambiguity of terms has also been noted in regard of diﬀerent
words and passages, see e.g. with regard to κατοτρίζω and καταργέω Stockhausen,
Moses’ Veil, 127: ‘The wisest course is simply to admit that when Paul uses an
ambiguous term or form, he means to play upon that very ambiguity. We must
allow him to do so.’
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15. Agamben, The Time that Remains, 131: ‘we have to venture something like a perfor-
mative eﬃcacy of the word of faith realized in its very pronouncement.’
16. Hays, “Πίστις and Pauline Christology,” 38.
17. Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 292–294. Morgan does not elaborate so
much on the theme of imitation in pistis. See p. 257, n. 162, which also includes a few
references to the New Testament: ‘Though imitation (of God, Christ, or those entrusted
with authority) is not often connected explicitly with pistis language here or elsewhere
in the New Testament, imitation can be seen as one way in which human beings learn
how to respond to the pistis that God and Christ extend to them.’
18. For example, Williams, “Again Pistis Christou,” 446: ‘Christian faith is Christ-faith,
that relationship to God which Christ exempliﬁed, that life-stance which he actualized
and which, because he lived and died, now characterizes the personal existence of
everyone who lives in him. Christ is not the “object” of such faith, however, but rather
its supreme exemplar—indeed, its creator.’
19. See for these reservations and their rebuttal, Hooker, “ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ,” 323. This
also seems to be the rationale behind Hays’ critique of Williams: ‘he downplays the
vicarious elements of Paul’s story of salvation. I would prefer to speak less of Jesus as
“exemplar” and somewhat more of Jesus as the σπέρμα (“seed”) whose apocalyptic
destiny of death and resurrection reshapes the destiny of those who are now “in” him.’
See Hays, “Πίστις and Pauline Christology,” 52.
20. Hooker, “Another Look at πίστις Xριστοῦ,” 53. Cf. Hooker, “ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ” and
Hooker, From Adam to Christ, chapter 14, ‘Pistis Christou’, 165–186.
21. Hooker, “ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ,” 323: ‘participation is a much better word than imita-
tion’; Hooker, From Adam to Christ, 92: ‘Of course this is not imitation, it is con-
formity’; Ibid., 183: ‘it is thus a question of sharing in what Christ is, not a question of
imitation.’
22. De Boer, The Imitation of Paul; Reinhartz, “Pauline exhortation”; Getty, “The Imitation
of Paul”; Castelli, Imitating Paul; Brant, “The Place of Mimēsis”; Clarke, “Be Imitators
of Me”; Dodd, Paul’s Paradigmatic ‘I’; Copan, Saint Paul as Spiritual Director; Eastman,
“Imitating Christ Imitating Us”; Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context, 199–219
(Section 2.4: ‘Paul, the image of God and likeness to Christ’); Ellington, “Imitating
Paul’s Relationship to the Gospel”; Williams, “Imitate Me”; Smit, Paradigms of Being in
Christ; Harrison, “The Imitation of the ‘Great Man’ in Antiquity”.
23. In this article, the references to theatre, stage, (en)acting, audience and such are merely
rich metaphors to conveniently describe the idea of a real-life associative context. A
case can and has been made, however, for viewing Paul’s imitation (or mimēsis)
language (esp. in Phillipians) against precisely this backdrop of the Greco-Roman
love for theatrics and dramatics: see Eastman, “Imitating Christ Imitating Us,”
427–450.
24. A discourse is usually thought of as a normative, integrated set of ideas to which
individual texts relate in a variety of ways, shaping the meaning of the discourse by
reframing the elements according to their purposes. In my application of the term, I am
not so much interested in the deconstruction of discourses of power (this is how
discourse analysis is often understood following the work of M. Foucault) as in the
manner in which an individual authors like Paul creatively reconﬁgure known sets of
ideas, thus shedding light on their own distinctive message.
25. From a methodological perspective, the phenomenon of ‘popular philosophy’ forms an
alternative to demonstrating one-to-one relationships between Paul and speciﬁc phi-
losophical traditions. See Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers and Thom,
“Popular Philosophy,” 279–295.
26. See e.g. on intertextuality and imitation MacDonald, Mimesis and Intertextuality, on
education and imitation Morgan, Literate Education, esp. 251–254, and Cribiore,
Gymnastics of the mind, 132–136; Witherington, Philippians, 76–78; on rhetoric and
imitation Fiore, Personal Example, 26–44.
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27. Most famous, perhaps, is the advice of Scipio’s father at the end of Cicero’s De Re
Publica (6.16) to ‘like your grandfather here, like me, practise justice and piety which
are indeed strictly due to parents and kinsmen, but most of all to the fatherland (ut
avus hic tuus, ut ego, qui te genui, iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna in
parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est)’. See on moral education and the
imitation of ancestors Marrou, A History of Education, 234–236. Some excellent
examples of the imitation of ancestral glory have been collected by Harrison, “The
Imitation of the ‘Great Man’,” 223–228. Translations of ancient Greek and Latin
sources have, with small revisions when necessary, taken over from the Loeb
Classical Library editions, unless stated otherwise.
28. Cicero, De Oﬃciis 1.33 (121). On the considerable overlap of meaning between pistis
and ﬁdes, see Freyburger, Fides: Étude Sémantique Et Religieuse, 33; Gruen, “Greek
Πίστις and Roman Fides,” 68.
29. In fact, according to Seneca, their ﬁngers were ﬁrst ‘held and guided by others so that
they may follow the outlines of the letters; next, they are ordered to imitate a copy and
base thereon a style of penmanship.’ See Epistulae 94.51.
30. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Imitatio fragment 6.1.
31. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.2.8.
32. For Plutarch’s and Seneca’s usage of exempla, see Brenk, “Setting a Good Exemplum,”
195–215.
33. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 12.2.29–30.
34. Cf.: ‘if indeed he is to attain perfection by the merits both of his life and of his
eloquence’ (Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 12.2.27); ‘No one can be a perfect orator
who does not both understand the language of honour and have the courage to use it
(qui honeste dicere et sciet et audebit)’ (Ibid., 12.2.31).
35. Plutarch’s Vitae are not all meant as one-on-one examples to imitate, though. As
pointed out by Christopher Pelling, sometimes, ‘[t]he moralism (…) is of a diﬀerent
sort, rather closer to that of tragedy: this is a more descriptive moralism, pointing a
truth of human experience rather than building a model for crude imitation or
avoidance.” (Pelling, “Aspects of Plutarch’s Characterisation,” 274). See, on the multi-
valence in the Lives and the critical position Plutarch expects of his readers, Duﬀ,
“Plutarch’s ‘Lives’ and the Critical Reader,” 59–82. On the moral purpose of Valerius
Maximus, see Skidmore, Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen.
36. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus III, 2.6.
37. Dionysius van Halicarnassus, Antiquitates Romanae 2.75.3.
38. For example, Xenophon, Cyropaedia 8.1.21: ‘he believed that he could in no way more
eﬀectively inspire a desire for the beautiful and the good than by endeavouring, as their
sovereign, to set before his subjects a perfect model of virtue in his own person.’;
Pseudo-Aristotle, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1420B7: ‘It will be necessary for you to
know that for most people either the law or your life and speech are models
(παραδείγματά).’
39. Plutarch, Ad principem ineruditem 780d.
40. Plutarch, Cato Minor 44.7–8.
41. Epictetus, Diatribae 3.22.27–28.
42. Apud Stobaeus, Anthologium 3.1.173 (128 and 142, respectively).
43. See Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt, 50–51.
44. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 10.1.3 (1172A34–35). Cf. Ethica Nicomachea 10.1.4
(1172B3–6): ‘Hence it appears that true theories are the most valuable for conduct as
well as for science; harmonizing with deeds, they carry conviction (συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες
τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται), and so encourage those who understand them to guide their
lives by them (ζῆν κατ’ αὐτούς).’
45. Musonius Rufus, Fragment 6, p. 22, r. 7–8 in Hense’s edition. Translations from Lutz
1947.
46. Musonius Rufus, Fragment 6, p. 23, r. 15–16 in Hense’s edition.
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47. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, esp. chapter 11.
48. Sellars, The Art of Living, 107.
49. Dihle, “Die Griechische Philosophie,” 17. Cf. Ibid., 18: ‘Das rechte Leben ist Inhalt und
Ziel philosophischer Lehre und sonst gar nichts, meinen kaiserzeitliche Autoren wie die
Stoiker Musonios und Epiktet.’ On the role of Socrates in shaping this practical
approach to philosophy cf. Cooper, “Socrates and Philosophy”.
50. Trapp, “Philosophy in the Imperial Period,” 55.
51. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 11.8–10.
52. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 6.5–6.
53. Cf. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 94.50, where he defends the use of precepts: ‘Weaker
characters, however, need someone to precede them, to say: “Avoid this,” or “Do that.”’
54. Cf. the degree by the Athenians on Zeno of Citium, in which they decide to build him a
tomb at public expense, praising him for ‘aﬀording to all in his own conduct a pattern
for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching’ (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae
Philosophorum, 7.10).
55. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.19.29.
56. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.19.30–34.
57. (Pseudo-)Plato, Epistulae 358c (letter X).
58. Cf. for a very sceptical judgment Irwin, “Plato: The Intellectual Background,” 78 and
Bury, Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles, 597. James Starr, who oﬀers an
interesting comparison of Paul and Plato as regards letter openings, argues for the
letter’s authenticity and imputes the focus on ethics to the occasional character of the
letter. See Starr, “Letter Openings in Paul and Plato,” 540.
59. In the mid-second century AD, Albinus states that some persons begin their reading of
Plato with the Epistles, which enhances the probability of its familiarity and availability in
that period. See Albinus, Prologos 6, translation in Burges, TheWorks of Plato Vol. VI, 318.
60. Bury, Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles, 597: ‘What is he re said of the
nature of “true philosophy” has fairly close parallel in the Dialogues (e.d. cf. Rep. 409D,
499A ﬀ.; Theaet. 176C); but the blunt way in which “philosophy” is identiﬁed with
purely moral qualities, with no reference to intellectual endowments, is foreign to
Plato’s manner. There need be no hesitation, therefore, in rejecting this letter also as
a spurious composition.’
61. Epicurus, Epistula ad Pythoclem, apud Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 10.85.
Epicurus’ authorship of this letter is contested.
62. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 4.80. Cicero envisioned himzelf a Platonist, even as
he was drawn towards diﬀerent ‘branches’, including the Stoics; this openmindedness
was characteristic of the New Academy. Cf. Sedley, “Philosophical Allegiance,”
118–119, esp. note 48.
63. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes 4.84: Et si ﬁdentia, id est ﬁrma animi conﬁsio, scientia
quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis (…).
64. Musonius Rufus, Fragment 8, p. 35, r. 8–15 in Hense’s edition.
65. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.9.10–14. Cf. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.2.3–7.
66. Cf. Dihle, “Die Griechische Philosophie,” 17: ‘So ist es kein wunder, dass die Umwelt
Philosophen oft mehr nach ihrer Lebensführung als nach ihrer Lehre beurteilte.’
67. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.19.23.
68. Epictetus, Diatribae 3.23.17–18.
69. Cicero, De Finibus 2.30.96. Cf. Seneca, Epistulae 66.48.
70. Cf. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.22.25–27; Ibid., 4.13.15.
71. Porphyrius, Ad Marcellam 8.
72. The classical loci are Theaetetus 176b–c; Politeia 611d–e and Timaeus 41d–47c.
73. Litwa, We are being transformed, 197.
74. See i.a. Sedley, “The ideal of godlikeness,” 309–328; Annas, Platonic Ethics, Chapter 3,
52–71: Erler, “Epicurus as Deus Mortalis,” 159–181; Armstrong, “Plato on Becoming
Like God,” 171–183; Russell, “Virtue as ‘Likeness to God’,” 241–260; Mahoney, “Moral
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Virtue,” 77–91; Dombrowski, A Platonic Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 6, 95–112: Van
Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 124–181; Miller, Becoming God; Constantinos and
Athanassiadi, “La Philosophisation Du Religieux,” 63–65.
75. Stobaeus, Anthologium 2.7.106 = SVF 3.661.
76. Epictetus, Diatribae 1.20.15.
77. Epicurus, Letter to Menoecus, apud Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 10.124.
78. For the presentation of homoiōsis as telos-formula by Eudorus, see Dillon, The Middle
Platonists, 114–135; Van Kooten, “The ‘image of God’ and ‘being made like God’,”
141–148.
79. A view that is shared by later Platonists like Plutarch, and might have been instigated
by the possible Pythagorean dictum ‘Follow God (ἕπου Θεῷ)’ (see Stobaeus,
Anthologium 2.249.8).
80. Stobaeus, Anthologium 2.7.3f.
81. Plato, Laws 716c.
82. Annas, Platonic Ethics, 52–53.
83. Brouwer, The Stoic Sage, 91, note 133.
84. Cf. Dombrowski, A Platonic Philosophy of Religion, 97: ‘Platonic askesis, however, does
not have to be seen in these terms in that the evidence of the dialogues of a certain
hostility toward the senses does not necessarily indicate a desire to escape from the
world but to transform it, or at least to transform our attitude toward it.’
85. Plato, Politeia 6.500c: ‘“Or do you think there is any way in which one would not
imitate something one enjoys being associated with (ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ
μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο)?” “No, that’s impossible,” he said. “The philosopher who allies himself
with the divine and orderly becomes divine and orderly, as far as is possible for a
human being (Θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ
δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται).”’
86. See 2 Corinthians 10.12, a passage which could very well be aimed at opponents with
similar sophistic views. On Laws 716c as anti-sophistic, cf Van Kooten, “The ‘image of
God’ and ‘being made like God’,” 134–135. On homoiōsis theōi in the virtues of justice
and piety as a means of combating sophists in the Theaetetus, cf. Sedley, “The ideal of
Godlikeness,” 313.
87. Cf. Politeia 6.500d: ‘“If then,” I said, “some compulsion comes upon him to put into
practice what he sees in the divine realm in the private and public lives of men (ἤθη καὶ
ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ), and to mold not just his own character, do you think he would
become a bad creator of temperance, justice, and every other common virtue
(σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς)?” “Certainly
not,” he said.’ Cf. also Armstrong’s thesis that ‘Plato’s identiﬁcation of god with νοῦς or
intelligence in the Timaeus, Philebus, and Laws inﬂuences his conception of assimila-
tion to god. Rather than ﬂeeing from the sensible world, becoming like this god
commits one to improving it.’ See Armstrong, “Plato on Becoming Like God,” 171.
See on otherworldliness in the Theaetetus Mahoney, “Assimilation to God in the
Theaetetus,” 321–338.
88. On the occurrence of sagehood according to the Stoics, cf. René Brouwer’s conclusion
that ‘the Stoics, Zeno included, were not self-declared sages.’ See Brouwer, The Stoic
Sage, 135.
89. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.19.26–28.
90. Maximus of Tyre, Orations 2.3. Translation by M.B. Trapp (1997).
91. Maximus of Tyre, Orations 13.2.
92. Alcinous, Epitome doctrinae Platonicae 2.2, 153.3–9. Translation by Dillon (1993).
93. Ibid., 28.2, 181.44–46.
94. Philo, De Opiﬁcio Mundi 69 and Quaestiones in Genesim 2.62 respectively. For a
discussion, see Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 181–199.
95. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, 205.
96. Ibid., 206.
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97. Note the ambiguity inherent to the word cultor, meaning both worshipper and culti-
vator, that is lost in translation.
98. Seneca, Epistulae Morales 73.16.
99. Ibid., 41.1–2. Pace Fitzgerald, “Passions and Moral Progress,” 275: ‘The contrast with
Paul’s moral vision of humanity redeemed to love, worship and glorify God (…) could
not be stronger. (…) In Seneca’s ethics, the moral power of the philosophic life, far
from revealing the need for God or leading to worship of God, rather demonstrates
one’s own equality with God’.
100. Seneca, Epistolae Morales 95.50.
101. Erler, “Epicurus as deus mortalis,” 178.
102. Ibid., 179, followed by Heath, Paul’s Visual Piety, p. 83.
103. Ibid., 179. The anonymous commentary was conventionally dated to the second
century AD, though some argue for an earlier date (ﬁrst century BC-early ﬁrst AD).
104. See note 85 above.
105. Cf. Politeia 6.500d, quoted in note 86 above.
106. Plutarch, Ad principem ineruditem 780e–f and 780b respectively. In this passage, the
language of assimilation to God and being an image of God coincide, cf. on this Van
Kooten,, “The ‘image of God’ and ‘being made like God’,” 215.
107. Plato, Phaedrus 253b–c.
108. Erler, “Epicurus as deus mortalis,” 177.
109. Some of these instances (the two upcoming passages from Epictetus and Silius Italicus)
are also discussed in Teresa Morgan’s comprehensive collection of pistis and ﬁdes
language Roman faith and Christian faith, under the heading of ‘Divine Pistis/ﬁdes
Towards Human Beings’ (128–142). Morgan, however, does not mention the topos of
homoiōsis theōi as such and is generally sceptical about New Testament authors
participating in what she calls ‘high’ philosophical discourses: ‘there are few if any
passages where ‘high’ philosophical ideas can plausibly be seen as forming even part of
the background to New Testament pistis language’ (151).
110. Plato, Politeia 500d.
111. Plato, Politeia 500d–e.
112. Fides is said to have had her ﬁrst temple erected either when the Trojans ﬁrst arrived at
Rome’s future site, or under the rule of Numa. See Freyburger, Fides, 259–260.
113. Silius Italicus, Punica 2.484–486.
114. Silius Italicus, Punica 2.515–517.
115. Epictetus, Diatribae 2.14.11–13.
116. Ibid., 2.8.28.
117. If we follow the analysis of David Hay, they together make up 93 cases, i.e.
59.6 per cent, of all Philo’s uses of pistis. See Hay, “Pistis as ‘Ground for Faith’,” 465,
see 464 note 14 and 15 for all speciﬁc passages.
118. The pistis of Abraham is described by Philo as a ‘perfect good’ (De migratione
Abrahami 44), ‘the most perfect of the virtues’ (Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 91)
and ‘the queen of the virtues’ (De Abrahamo 270).
119. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 93. Cf. Philo, De virtutibus 218: [Abraham] put
his trust (πιστεύσαντα) in nothing created rather than in the Uncreated and Father of
all’.
120. Philo, De confusione linguarum 31.
121. Cf. Daniélou, Philo of Alexandria, 152: ‘Indeed, for Philo, faith is essentially the act by
which the soul adheres to God’s immutable realm, turning away from the unstable
world of sensible life. (…) its precise meaning is the mind’s adhesion to intelligible
realities that are stable and establish the mind in the realm of immutability.’
122. On the importance of the transcendence of God in Philo and in the Platonism of his
days, cf. Bonazzi, “Towards Transcendence,” 233–252. On the increasing scepticism
this involved, cf. Runia, “The Beginnings of the End,” 302–303.
123. Philo, De mutatione nominum 181–183.
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124. See, for instance, Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1115e: ‘The relation of the partaken in to
the partaker is that of cause to matter, model to copy, power to eﬀect (ὃν αἰτία τε πρὸς
ὕλην ἔχει καὶ παράδειγμα πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ δύναμις πρὸς πάθος)’ and my discussion of
this passage in Sierksma-Agteres, “‘Say goodbye to opinions!’,” 68–69.
125. For some important references, see note 22 above.
126. Hebrews 13.7. Leaders are to be minded for the outcome of their conduct and perhaps,
since ekbasis can also refer to death, even for their literal departure from life.
Translations of biblical texts have been taken over from the NRSV, with minor
revisions when necessary.
127. The full phrase reads εἰς τὴν ὑμῶν προκοπὴν καὶ χαρὰν τῆς πίστεως. I here take the
genetive pisteōs to refer to both progress and joy, alternatively it may refer only to joy.
128. Paul refers to the gnomic maxim that household stewards need to be found trust-
worthy: 4.2. On Paul’s use of maxims see Ramsaran, Liberating Words, on this speciﬁc
maxim: 35.
129. 1 Corinthians 4.15–17.
130. 1 Thessalonians 1.6–8.
131. For horizontal imitation of ‘normal’ Christ-followers, cf. Philippians 3.17: ‘Brothers and
sisters, join in imitating me (συμμιμηταί μου γίνεσθε), and observe those who live
according to the example you have in us (καθὼς ἔχετε τύπον ἡμᾶς).’
132. To avoid any confusion, by ‘content’ I mean that which is to be imitated, namely the
faithful life, not cognitive beliefs as in the Thomistic ﬁdes quae.
133. Romans 6.8.
134. 1 Thessalonians 4.14.
135. Romans 10.9–10a: ‘if you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your
heart that God raised him from the dead (καὶ πιστεύσῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου ὅτι ὁ θεὸς
αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν), you will be saved. For one believes with the heart and so is
justiﬁed (καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην) (…)’ For an ethical interpretation of
justice as in line with Paul’s Judaism, see Vanlandingham, Judgment and Justiﬁcation.
136. 2 Corinthians 5.21.
137. Galatians 4.19: ‘My little children, for whom I am again in the pain of childbirth until
Christ is formed in you (τέκνα μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν
ὑμῖν) (…)’
138. 1 Corinthians 15.2: ‘through which also you are being saved, if you hold ﬁrmly to the
message that I proclaimed to you—unless you have come to believe in vain’; 1
Corinthians 15.14: ‘and if Christ has not been raised, then our proclamation has been
in vain and your faith has been in vain (κενὴ καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν)’; 1 Corinthians 15.17:
‘If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile (ματαία ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν) and you are
still in your sins.’
139. See e.g. Miller, The Third Kind, 61.
140. Most famously by Albert Schweitzer: Schweitzer, Mysticism, 122–123.
141. Galatians 2.20 (discussed below); 2 Corinthians 13.5.
142. 2 Corinthians 13.5.
143. Cf. Wisdom 7.27: ‘And being but one, she can do all things: And remaining in herself,
she maketh all things new: And in all ages entering into holy souls (εἰς ψυχὰς ὁσίας
μεταβαίνουσα), she maketh them friends of God, and prophets.’ (Translation L.C.L.
Brenton.)
144. 2 Timothy 2.11–13.
145. Cf. Paul’s questions in the Letter to the Romans, ‘What if some were unfaithful (εἰ
ἠπίστησάν τινες)? Will their faithlessness nullify the faithfulness of God (μὴ ἡ ἀπιστία
αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ καταργήσει)? (Romans 3.3). These questions, however, seem
to come up from a covenantal, rather than mimetic setting, since it is Israel here, who is
portrayed as having betrayed God’s trust, manifested in entrusting the divine oracles.
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146. Schenck, “2 Corinthians,” 525: ‘Although I resist the “neglected evidence” title, my
ultimate interest in the current study is what 2 Cor 4:13 might contribute to this
discussion.’
147. 2 Corinthians 4.13–14a.
148. Schenck,“2 Corinthians,” 527–529. He substantiates this argument i.a. by referring to
the early Christian practice of reading the psalms ‘as if Christ were uttering them’ (529,
referring to Hays, “Christ Prays the Psalms,” 122–136). Unfortunately, Schenck does
not seem aware that the same case, namely ‘that Paul has this entire story in mind as he
cites LXX Pss 114–115 in 2 Cor 4:13 (…) precisely because it serves as an apt
expression of the story of Jesus’, had already been made, though not so much in
context of the pistis Christou discussion, by Thomas Stegman in The Character of
Jesus, 146–168, cited from pages 156–157.
149. Cited from Schenck, “2 Corinthians,” 526. The motive of imitation if Christ’s character
in Paul, particularly in 2 Corinthians, is amply treated, however, by Stegman, The
Character of Jesus, even though he also leaves out contemporary sources on moral
imitation.
150. 1 Corinthians 1.9; Ibid., 10.13; 2 Corinthians 1.18; 1 Thessalonians 5.24.
151. 2 Corinthians 1.18–21a.
152. 1 Corinthians 2.16: ‘For who has known the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?’ Cf.
LXX, Isa 40.13: τίς ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου, καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ σύμβουλος ἐγένετο, ὃς συμβιβᾷ
αὐτόν).
153. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 213. Cf. his entire Section 2.2, “The ‘image of God’
and ‘being made like God’: The traditions of homoiosis theoi in Greek philosophy from
Plato to Plotinus,” 124–181.
154. See Phillipians 2.7, ‘but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (μορφὴν δούλου),
being born in human likeness (ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος)’ and Romans 8.3
‘by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful ﬂesh (ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας
ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας)’. Cf. Van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology, 216: ‘By
emphasizing the descent of the heavenly man, his incarnation, and assimilation to
man, Paul seems to enhance man’s ability to become of the same form as him.’ cf.
Eastman, “Imitating Christ Imitating Us,” 434–448 on Christ ﬁrst mimicking Adam/
humanity in Philippians.
155. Cf. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, 249: ‘as we respond in faith, we participate in an
ongoing reenactment of Christ’s faithfulness.’
156. Galatians 2.20.
157. Galatians 3.24.
158. Silius Italicus, Punica 495.
159. Ephesians 4.24.
160. Plato, Theaetetus 176b: ‘to become like God is to become righteous and holy with
wisdom (ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθα)’. This connection to
Platonic homoiōsis language is missed by Volker Rabens, who only refers to the LXX.
See Rabens, “Pneuma and the Beholding of God,” 323.
161. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 2.22.136.
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